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The 1945 elections gave the Labour Party an absolute
majority in the Norwegian parliament, the Storting. The party
was committed to rapid reconstruction as well as further eco-
► nomic growth. The government considered it possible to complete
the reconstruction effort by 1950 with an annual import sur-
- plus of nearly 1000 million Norwegian crowns. At the time
of liberation Norwegian currency reserves, mainly pounds,
amounted to around 2000 million crowns. The demand for foreign
currency, particularly dollars, would far exceed currency
reserves and export earnings. It was assumed, however, that
dollar loans would be fairly easily available 1. Reconstruction
and growth policies aimed above all at promoting Norwegian
export industries, which was considered essential both to
meet debt obligations, and generally to improve the standard
of living. In order to achieve its economic objectives, the
Labour government was highly dependent upon the West for loans
2as well as markets
Norway's foreign policy stance was somewhat ambiguous. The 
term "bridge-building" was coined to characterize the country's 
position between East and West. This formula implies an active 
policy of mediation between the powers. In this respect the 
term is misleading. In the fundamentals of security policy 
the crucial cabinet members and the leading makers of defence 
and foreign policies realized Norwegian dependence on Great 
Britain and increasingly the United States as well. But such 
views were not generally accepted either in the Storting or 
_ among the interested public. The government in practice im­
plemented the bridge-building policy by withdrawing from arenas 
„ of possible conflict, by abstaining on U.N. or Peace Conference
votes, or by declining membership in institutions such as the 
Security Council, which might force the country to choose 
between the two emerging blocs. The bridge-building policy was3basically one of passivity
Domestically the Labour Party was faced with two main op­
position groups. On the left the Communists in 1945 polled an 
all-time high of more than 11% of the vote, on the right a 




























































































returned with a minority of the vote as well as the parliamen­
tary seats. The Christian People's party had no clear profile 
either in economic or foreign policy, but was generally the 
closest to the Labour party. The Agrarian pary was both staunchly 
nationalist and sceptical of further industrialization. It was 
at the same time somewhat discredited by its wartime record, 
and most of its parliamentarians kept a fairly low profile.
The Liberals and the Conservatices were not as uniformly op­
posed to industrial modernization, but were generally not in 
favour of largescale manufacturing units and strongly suppor­
tive of agriculture. A number of younger and influential conser­
vative members were, however, inclined to give partial support 
to the Labour Party's modernization programme. As regards foreign 
policy, the non-Socialists were certainly less enthusiastic 
about Russia than the Labour party; but better and closer fo­
reign and trade relations were firmly supported by eminently
respectable bourgeois politicians, Home Front leaders and busi- 
4nessmen
During the transitional period from war to peace Norway's 
political parties agreed on the so-called 'Common Programme' 
to facilitate reconstruction. Despite somewhat conflicting 
interpretations of the programme, it did provide considerable 
common ground in such goals as growth and full employment, and 
in the general acceptance of the need for continued strict con­
trol of the economy. The Labour Party leadership had been in­
strumental in bringing about the Common Programme, and in most 
respects it conformed closely to its 1945 election platform.
The programme was important both for its practical policy value5and as a symbol of unity
But this unity on reconstruction and foreign policies did 
not preclude strong political disagreements in certain fields, 
including violent verbal attacks on government policies. By 
1947 the Conservatives in particular were attacking both the 
bridgebuilding policy and the implementation of the system of 
economic controls. The Communists joined in from the other side, 




























































































too strong . The scope for cross-party agreement seemed to 
be narrowing, while disagreement over the problems of industry 
and agriculture was obviously deepening.
The lines of conflict were drawn not just between Labour 
and the two opposition groups, there was also considerable 
disagreement within the Labour Party both on foreign policy 
and to a lesser degree on issues of economic policy. Signifi­
cant elements were opposed to the Western orientation, while 
other leading party members were rather reluctant industriali- 
zers. On the other hand, from 1946 on, influential party offi­
cials and members wanted a clearer Norwegian alignment with 
the West. Any adjustment of Labour Party policies would thus 
cause conflict with some part of the parliamentary opposition, 
as well as internal party strife. On the other hand it would be
faced with the same unpleasant alternatives by continuing along
7the chosen track
The Marshall Plan brought these problems to the fore, with 
NATO foreign policy and foreign economic issues became crucial 
in Norwegian politics. In the following decades the terms of 
their settlement would bear significantly not just on these 
issues, but on domestic political alignments and loyalties 
more generally. In the following sections we shall first look 
more closely at ends and means in Norwegian reconstruction, 
and particularly concentrate on the apparent contradictions 
of reconstruction policy. The Marshall Plan on the one hand 
offered a solution to some of these inherent problems, on the 
other hand presented serious domestic and foreign policy pro­
blems. These issues of foreign aid and foreign policy realign­
ment constitute the second theme. We shall finally consider 
reconstruction and the Marshall Plan in view of the subsequent 





























































































The reconstruction policies of the Labour government above 
all reflect the interwar experience. Labour politicians and 
their economists —  and economists played an important role 
in postwar Norway —  developed a set of assumptions about post­
war developments which to a great degree built upon the per­
ceived lessons of the preceding decades. To understand Nor­
wegian reconstruction policies, and the Labour government's 
reactions to events abroad, we must examine these assumptions, 
and the elements of inconsistency which we can discern between 
assumptions and reconstruction planning.
In the first place both politicians and economists ex­
pected a postwar inflation followed by a depression, much 
as had happened after the First World War. Their expectations 
were considerably strengthened by the Swedish economist Gun- 
nar Myrdal's book Varning f#r Fredsoptimism (A Warning against 
Peace Optimism) published in 1944. The postwar depression was 
expected to originate in the United States and then spread to 
Europe. In order to limit the consequences for the Norwegian 
economy the government put into effect the so-called stabili­
zation policy. Strict controls and heavy subsidies were em­
ployed to keep a lid on both prices and wages during the firstOinflationary period
In retrospect Norwegian, and in particular Labour attitudes 
towards the expected depression, seem somewhat ambivalent. 
Clearly no-one wanted the depression, yet it would vindicate 
socialist distrust of capitalism. The leading economist of the 
day, Ragnar Frisch, in late 1946 was convinced that future 
developments "would provide a model example of the convulsions 
to be experienced by any modern capitalist society under un­
bridled freedom". He chose Norway's largest current affairs 
journal for his article, and while his prose on that occasion 
was rather florid, his views were certainly shared by most So-9cial Democrats . Labour leaders held on to the idea of a de­




























































































seems reasonable to assume that they did so because it con­
formed so well with their ideological conceptions
The Labour government was committed to rapid reconstruction 
and further growth in order to deliver Norway from unemploy­
ment and poverty. A massive industrialization effort represen­
ted the escape route from both predicaments. The country's 
vast hydroelectric potential was to be developed as the basis 
for major manufacturing exports 11. It seems that both poli­
ticians and economists expected European -- including German 
—  recovery and reconstruction to proceed at a much quicker 
pace than proved to be the case and that the new export indus­
tries thus would readily find markets for their products. Fur­
thermore it seems that the government also expected fairly 
rapid international dismantling of market controls and regula­
tions, and indeed counted on international liberalization as
a precondition for the future growth of Norwegian export in-
, . . 12 dustries
Obviously these plans and assumptions contain elements that 
are not entirely consistent. From our vantage point the dis­
crepancies between planning, hopes and prognosis are clearly 
evident, some were also remarked upon by contemporaries. It 
is first of all difficult to reconcile the plans for an immi­
nent international depression. Industrial expansion and inno­
vation was to be financed not just bv the sizeable currency 
reserves resulting from wartime earnings in shipping, but also
by massive borrowing abroad. These loans were to be repaid by
13the earnings of the new export industries
Rapid international reconstruction, particularly in the
case of Germany, and international liberalization under the
Bretton Woods system, would facilitate Norwegian reconstruction.
Minister of Finance Erik Brofoss, in spite of his pronounced
anti-German stance, seems to have not only expected but also to
14have favoured an immediate German reconstruction . The ex­
pected depression would have posed enormous problems for Nor­
wegian reconstruction and the modernization strateav, as con­
tracting markets would have provided maior obstacles for Nor- 




























































































dollars and reconstruction materials would be easily available
during a depression. In the event, it was scarcity of dollars
and goods that posed the main obstacles for reconstruction and
growth. But as one of the foremost planners —  and present
chairman of the Norwegian Central Bank —  Knut Getz Wold later
put it: "a world depression or new foreign trade barriers
15could have played havoc with the economy"
There has so far been no scholarly work on the relation­
ship between the depression prognosis and postwar planning.
But the planners and politicians who spent the war years in 
London, and Brofoss and Getz Wold were among them, were cer­
tainly aware of the difficulties that the export industries 
would be facing. The opposition seems only to have been dimly 
aware of any possible inconsistency.
The prominent Conservative parliamentarian Sjur Lindebrekke 
raised the point hesitantly during the October 1947 debate on 
the National Budget. When Brofoss disregarded the point, Lin­
debrekke did not pursue it 1 . The incident is worthy of no­
tice because Brofoss normally did not let such criticism pass 
without comment. We shall return to the issue shortly.
While the possible inconsistencies between plan and prog­
nosis went largely unnoticed, there was no lack of awareness 
of what a number of prominent contemporaries considered the 
inherent contradiction between the extensive use of regulations 
and subsidies on the part of the Norwegian government, and the 
professed belief in international liberalization as a means 
for promoting growth. Among the critics were the former Libe­
ral Minister of Finance, prominent Home Front leader and chair­
man of the Board of Directors of the Norwegian Central Bank, 
Gunnar Jahn, the prominent Labour Party economist/politician 
Arne Skaug, Sjur Lindebrekke, and the Chief of the Foreign 
Trade Division of the Foreign Ministry, Johan Melander.
Apart from Lindebrekke and occasionally Jahn, the critics 
do not seem to have taken their objections to a larger public. 
There was nevertheless considerable concern that a more liberal 
world order and Norwegian regulations were in fact incompati­
ble. Jahn certainly did not see the issue in terms of securing 




























































































basically liberal world order. He saw the system of domestic
regulations as far too extensive to be squared with interna-
17tional liberalization . In later years some students of Nor­
wegian economic history have tended to agree with Jahn's view
18that the government was pursuing inconsistent policies
How do we explain these inconsistencies, if in fact we 
can reasonably consider them inconsistencies? And why did the 
issues attract such modest attention in the political-economic 
debates during the late 1940s? By attempting to answer these 
questions, we shall also approach the problem of the relation­
ship between postwar Norwegian planning and the reactions to 
the Marshall Plan offer in June of 1947.
It seems above all that the Labour Party was so preoccu­
pied with the necessity for growth to escape poverty and mass 
unemployment that they did not pay much attention to the possi­
ble adverse effects on Norwegian exports of a future depression. 
We may even conclude that those who could clearly see the 
dilemma could point to no other growth strategy. Furthermore, 
while a depression was considered most likely, its duration 
and depth was a matter for speculation. By prudent planning a 
reserve budget was prepared during this period, the government 
could conceivably steer clear of the most damaging consequences.
A gamble certainly seems to have been considered preferable to
19probable disaster
In the short run imports and domestic economy had first 
priority. The most pressing problems were neither those of 
export markets nor of foreign exchange shortages, but of having 
reconstruction goods delivered and maintaining the stabilization 
policy. The possible contradictions between prognosis and plan 
did not easily come to attention. It seems also that the Nor­
wegian planning milieu was basically oriented towards the
domestic scene, with the exception of some of those who had
20spent the war in exile in London . It seems a symbolic act
of some significance that after the dollar crisis hit Norway
in August 1947, Erik Brofoss by the end of the year moved to
a reconstituted Ministry of Trade, taking his planning staff
along. Brofoss was to retain control over planning while acqui-




























































































When Labour Party politicians and economists looked abroad, 
they looked to Britain as a model of economic and social plan­
ning. They also assumed that British countercyclical policies 
would contribute to largely insulating Northern and Northwes­
tern Europe from the effects of an American depression. They 
were undoubtedly in the main thinking of the unemployment pro­
blem, but may have assumed that export markets would hold up
22better as well
The lack of concern with foreign exchange earnings during
a depression may also be explained by the fact that Norway had
23been running a surplus on corrent account during the 1930s 
On balance it seems that Labour Party politicians and econo­
mists were neither terribly worried by the possible contradic­
tory elements in their plans and predictions nor did they want 
to engage in any public discussion of these issues. It seems 
that they considered modernization through the creation of new 
export industries essential, whatever the risks. The bourgeois 
parties in the Storting seem not to have grasped the possible 
contradiction at all, with the exception of Lindebrekke's
O Arather hesitant remarks . As a result Labour was not forced 
to defend its position, nor to explain its conception of the 
likely postwar world.
This is not to imply that the Labour government never wor­
ried about currency problems. The need for foreign loans was 
frequently emphasized and in particular the crucial importance 
of dollars. The short-term problem in practice commanded their 
attention. The importance of dollar loans for Norwegian recon­
struction was emphasized by Finance Minister Brofoss during the 
two debates on a $50 million loan from the Export-Import Bank, 
that took place in the fall of 1946 and the spring of 1947.
But we should also keep in mind the context of these debates. 
The Storting was extremely reluctant to accept the American 
conditions for the loan, particularly the demand that 50% of 
the goods purchased should be carried on American ships. In 
fact in the Committee on Finance the majority came out against 
the loan, including two of the seven Labour members of the Com­




























































































the vote in the Storting. He explained that during the com­
mittee deliberations he had the impression that Brofoss did 
not consider the loan very important. He changed sides because 
he understood the currency problem was more serious than he 
had assumed. The Communists and the bourgeois parties, however, 
remained opposed
It seems, nevertheless, that on both of these occasions 
the cabinet spokesmen tailored the arguments to the necessity 
for persuading the Storting, and publicly described the situa­
tion as more dramatic than they assumed it to be. The opposi­
tion was not convinced, and they might well have pointed to 
other government statements to support their scepticism. While 
the foreign exchange situation undoubtedly was considered more 
serious in spring 1947 than in the previous year, we find no 
indications that the Norwegian government feared that the coun­
try was heading into a foreign exchange crisis. It is charac­
teristic that as late as the summer of 1947 cabinet members 
and administrators were more worried about the fact that recon­
struction goods were coming in slowly than that Norway would 
be lacking in foreign exchange. Some were even quite optimistic
assuming the American depression to be at hand and cautioning
2 6against stockpiling because prices would be falling shortly
Only a small number of those responsible for the planning 
and execution of Norwegian economic policy seem to have been 
significantly disturbed about the dollar situation from late 
1946. This seems to have come about partly as a consequence 
of a dwindling belief in the probability of a major American 
depression. Foremost among them was Gunnar Jahn, later joined 
by Arne Skaug who from 1947 was chief Norwegian GATT negotia­
tor in Geneva. But theirs was a minority view, and even the 
arch-pessimist Gunnar Jahn did not see the dollar problem as
27a. threat to Norwegian reconstruction until the summer of 1947
These internationally orientated politicians and administra 
tors were also the persons most worried about the possible in­
compatibility between the desire for a system of domestic eco­
nomic controls and internationa liberalization. We may here 




























































































approaches to Norwegian foreign and domestic economic policy. 
Such a conclusion, it seems to me, would represent an over­
simplification of a very complex situation, and un unreasonable 
disregard for the many Norwegian policy statements upholding
the Bretton Woods system as best for the world, and certainly
2 8best for Norway
We can explain the divergent lines of policy by pointing 
to the fact that different policymakers and administrators 
held different positions of responsibility, which in the fluid 
postwar situation tended to draw their interests and policies 
in divergent directions. They also came out of the war with 
very different experiences and predispositions. In a chaotic 
situation with the main actors carrying an enormous workload 
we must allow for some divergent or conflicting policies without 
seeing fundamental conflicts of principle. The Bretton Woods 
system certainly allowed the employment of certain domestic 
controls under such circumstances, and the Norwegian govern­
ment was hardly unique in its policies, though they were 
carried very far. »
This is not to deny that there were both politicians and
economists within the governing party who would have been happy
to see a system of even stricter controls, who were sceptical
of or possibly opposed to Marshall Plan participation for
precisely that reason, and who would have described planning
29and international liberalization as incompatible . They were 
Jahn's and Melander's counterparts on the other side. Basically, 
however, the Norwegian government was in favour of interna­
tional liberalization, and the issue represents not a clash 
of conflicting principles but a trade-off between competing 
interests.
Notwithstanding Norway's large foreign trade and its de­
pendency upon foreign loans and resources for reconstruction, 
there was little debate over these issues of foreign economic 
policy. Partly they were poorly understood, partly they were 
not considered crucial. But above all they seem to have been 
overshadowed by others that were considered more fundamental, 
that certainly were more dramatic, and that were more easily 




























































































one hand the issue of national sovereignty and big power domi­
nance, on the other hand that of industrial development or in­
creased support for agriculture. These issues served as divi­
ding lines between the parties, while at the same time causing 
conflict within.
The struggle over agriculture and industry was by far the 
more important. During 1946 and 1947, Gabriel Moseid, the main 
spokesman of the Agrarian party, argued over and over again 
for some sort of national self-sufficiency. He considered it 
possible to reconstruct Norway by means of indigenous resources.
He visualized Norway as a basically agricultural country and 
objected not only to the import policies of the government 
but to industrialization in general. In the 1947 debate on 
the budget he claimed that agriculture constituted the basis 
for the existence of an independent Norway, "with a culturally 
and morally advanced people". He objected to the idea that Nor­
way was a poor country and was certain that it could sustain
30a much larger population
While Moseid's phraseology may have been somewhat extreme,
his point of view enjoyed considerable support from the other
non-Labour parties. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives
had strong rural wings in their parliamentary parties. Support
for agriculture involved not merely the question of economic
structure, but also of political power and stability. Large-scale
industrialization involved a larger working class, with the
concomitant fear of unemployment, radicalization and a steadily
expanding role for the state 1. In practical terms we see this
very clearly in the struggle over farm prices and farm support
in 1946 and particularly 1947. In 1947 even the modernizers
within the Conservative party, Sjur Lindebrekke was foremost
among them, agreed to push for an agricultural settlement far
more favourable to the farmers than Brofoss would accept. The
final compromise outcome seems to have contributed to Brofoss's
32decision to move to the Ministry of Trade later that year
But the bourgeois parties could not have achieved such a 
result by themselves. There was also considerable internal Labour 




























































































panding large-scale manufacturing industries. The party also
represented small-scale farmers and fishermen, i.e. rural and
coastal communities hardly enthusiastic about the party line.
The sceptics included such prominent party figures as Olav
Oksvik, acting Minister of Agriculture from December 1947 to
March 1948, and Olav Meisdalshagen, Brofoss's successor as
33Minister of Finance
But the broader significance of these conflicts over foreign 
loans and agricultural prices lie not so much in the modifica­
tion of Labour policies or the disciplinary action necessary 
to reach a satisfactory outcome. The debates show a coalescence 
of the radical left with rural and peripheral interests 
within all parties from Labour to the Conservatives. One of the 
dissenting labourites in the Ex-Im vote belonged to the extreme 
left of the party, others who voiced their disquiet with the 
industrial-agricultural dimension and the dependence on fo­
reign loans, came from rural and/or coastal regions
The combination of widely disparate interests against the 
reconstruction and modernization policies of the Labour Party, 
with some support from within the Conservative party, is best 
illustrated by the Communist support for the Agrarian opposi­
tion. The Communists in principle as well as in practical mea­
sures were in favour of modernization and fairly strict econo­
mic controls. They were on the other hand strongly opposed to 
increasing foreign economic dependence upon the United States. 
The Communists might easily be portrayed as inconsistent when 
supporting the goals of the Labour Party without being willing 
to accept the necessary means. For tactical purposes, then, the 
bourgeois opposition to the Ex-Im loan came in very handy. Com­
munist member Jurgen Vogt expressed total agreement with the 
Agrarians when they warned: "of the danger of bringing our
country into a fateful dependence upon foreign capital and in-
35fluence" . They could market themselves as impeccable natio­
nalists .
Opposition to Labour Party domestic and foreign economic 




























































































rians disliked both foreign capital for development and possi­
bly increasing big power influence. Opposition against Labour 
farm policies was just another aspect of their struggle against 
modernization through industrialization. The Liberal party in 
the Storting was neither as dogmatic nor as outspoken as the 
Agrarians, but generally favoured the same policies. The Con­
servatives, after considerable internal struggle, in 1947 de­
cided to join the Agrarians and the Liberals in the struggle 
against Labour farm policies. They feared the loss of their 
voters. In view of Conservative foreign policy attitudes in 
subsequent years it is also noteworthy that the party opposed 
the Ex-Im loan not just because of the shipping clause as a
form of discrimination, but because it served as a symbol: "of
3 6the struggle small nations are pursuing and now must pursue"
Parliamentary leader C.J. Hambro was a strong spokesman for
the rights of small states in international relations and his
37views were widely supported within the party at the time
The modernization drive and the great demand for dollar 
loans thus were bringing together different oppositional 
groups whose ultimate policy aims certainly varied considera­
bly. The debate over the Ex-Im loan in particular also served 
to highlight the divergence of views within the Labour Party.
Even there the left of the party found common ground with more 
moderate representatives from rural and coastal areas. Anti- 
-American and pro-Soviet members could join in opposition with 
members generally sceptical of big powers and rapid industria­
lization.
The questions of a possible discrepancy between plan and 
prognosis, between regulations and international liberalization, 
were thus overshadowed by more emotional and easily comprehen­
ded issues. Furthermore, while we may from our vantage point 
see significant elements of inconsistency or incompatibility 
in Norwegian reconstruction and growth policies, the situation 
was chaotic and the dividing lines fuzzy. The government above 
all seems to have been ambivalent about its foreign economic 
policies and prospects, while assuming it still had some free­
dom of action as compared to most other European countries. There 




























































































But as the international dollar crisis deepened throughout
the spring of 1947 the Labour Party leadership came to regard
foreign currency, and dollars above all, as more critical, while
feeling less certain about the expected depression. In other
words, while the opposition for highly divergent reasons was
criticizing its policies the Labour Party was contemplating
the necessity for loans additional to those from the Export-
-Import Bank. The government had tried to diversify Norwegian
trade and spread its risks by negotiating a trade agreement with
Russia in 1946-47, but the material base for such trade was ex-
3 8tremely slender . A more complete British orientation was
contemplated at one time, but in the spring of 1947 there was
3 9no short-term alternative to the United States . At the same
time the bridge-building policy was ccming under fire both
40domestically and internationally . In this situation the 
Marshall Plan was no mere blessing for the Norwegian government. 
Grants and loans would certainly contribute to solving the fo­
reign exchange problem, but the possible complications were 




























































































The United States devised the Marshall Plan offer so that 
the Russians would be held responsible for dividing Europe.
In this they were generally successful. But the Norwegian La­
bour government initially saw the issue differently. As far 
as Norway was concerned the initiative posed awkward dilemmas. 
The Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, at first considered the 
possibility of remaining outside. It seems then that two fac­
tors were crucial in bringing Norway in. In the first place 
Denmark was in such a precarious position that she had no 
choice but to join. Since Scandinavian unity, short of any kind 
of political and military bloc, was a highly desired goal, Den­
mark's problems drew Norway towards participation. Secondly, 
as other neutrally inclined countries of Europe signalled their 
desire to join, it would be considered more of a break with
41the established foreign policy to remain outside than to join
The initial reaction reflects the primacy of foreign policy 
considerations, including the desire to minimize domestic 
disagreements over foreign policy. At this stage it was assumed 
that the smallest possible change would cause the least dis­
agreement. The bridge-building policy presupposed the possibi­
lity of joining some sort of Western alliance in times of in­
creasing international tension, or at least some kind of Wes­
tern commitment to protect Norway. In the summer of 1947 the 
government did not find the time ripe for abandoning the bridge-
-building policy, which was still assumed to have the support
4 2of the majority of Labour Party voters and members . Left-wing 
criticism of the United States and admiration for Russia was 
still widespread. Party current affairs commentators highlighted 
the Truman doctrine and American involvement in Greece, while 
downplaying the Russian role in Eastern Europe. The party's 
journal Kontakt (Contact) in April claimed that Hungarian demo­
cracy was threatened: "but not from the Left". Even as late as
the fall of 1947 Kontakt found the power struggle in Romania
43still undecided . In the aftermath of Marshall's speech the 





























































































socialism —  including social democracy —  in Europe. Those
who were in favour of an alignment with the West could point
44to no party groundswell in their favour
The Norwegian government rather reluctantly decided to at­
tend the Paris conference which first met in the middle of July 
When the delegation was chosen it was emphasized that the con­
ference was an economic one with no foreign policy implica­
tions. The government underlined the point by appointing as 
chairmen of the negotiating team persons who qualified as tech­
nical experts. Arne Skaug, director of the Bureau of Statistics 
Klaus Sunnanâ, chairman of the Economic Cooperation Council —  
the apex of the Norwegian corporatist structure — , and Ole 
Colbj^rnsen, counsellor in charge of economic affairs at the 
embassy in Washington, alternated or cooperated as chairmen of 
the delegation. But technical expertise was merely the façade,
all three were at the same time important political actors
4 Swithin the Labour Party
The government aimed at toning down the Western bloc im­
plications of the conference as far as possible, both in the 
opinion of the Norwegian electorate and in fact. For this rea­
son the Paris delegation initially proposed that aid be dis­
tributed through the newly established United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, it systematically tried to reduce the 
elements of cooperation between the participating nations, ad­
vocated a shopping list approach very similar to that advoca­
ted by the Russians at the preceding three-power conference, 
and joined the CEEC Executive Committee to serve as a brake on 
any initiative for closer cooperation or integration. This 
policy was consistenly adhered to during the first month of 
the Paris conference
The foreign policy motivated approach was facilitated by 
the government's expectation of a major depression in the 
United States and by the assumption that the Norwegian foreign 
exchange situation was not critical. It seems indeed that the 
American initative reactivated hopes and fears that had been 




























































































both the Finance Minister and his planners formally stated 
that Norway could do with quite minimal aid from the United 
States during the four year plan period. The first estimate 
put the requirements at $70 million. It was subsequently re­
vised upwards to $100 million when submitted to the Paris con­
ference. The minutes of the discussion, however, reveal that
the figures were set artificially low when compared to actual 
4 7needs . But there still seems no doubt that the planners 
thought they could make do with less than a quarter of what 
Norway in the end received through the Marshall Plan, nor 
that this greater optimism in some degree resulted from the 
desire to remain to the greatest possible degree independent 
of any Western bloc.
The policy of non-cooperation and modest requirements was 
pursued until the middle of August. It was then first modified 
and then virtually given up as the Norwegian government was 
faced with strong American demands for greater cooperation 
among the European countries, while at the same time being 
struck by a sudden dollar crisis. The archival resources so 
far available do not permit us to weigh the relative import­
ance of the two causes for change directly. But it seems possi­
ble to reach a conclusion by discussing the problem in a wider 
context.
It seems highly improbable that the Norwegian government 
would have abandoned the Paris negotiations unless the United 
States had made demands which would have proved unacceptable 
to the majority of the participating countries. It is true 
that a government White Paper prepared just before the dollar 
crisis broke in the middle of August argued that Norway could 
do without American aid if necessary. And throughout the fall 
the government retained the option of not joining. But these 
were contingency plans, preparing for the worst possible out­
come of the Paris and Washington negotiations. The minimal 
foreign policy choice had already been made. To break with the 
United States and Western Europe would constitute a major and 
unthinkable change of policy. Yet it is quite possible that 




























































































September Norway was rarely leading the opposition against 
greater measures of cooperation. The delegation was then much 
more careful not to promote policies that might further exacer­
bate tension between Americans and Europeans. In September Nor-
48way could no longer argue from a position of relative strength
We cannot here go deeply into the reasons for the sudden 
appearance of the dollar crisis. Obviously part of the expla­
nation must be sought in the sheer magnitude of the tasks en­
trusted to the bureaucracy and the shortcomings of the bureau­
cracy. It quite simply proved impossible to control the li-
49censing system properly . Secondly, it seems that neither 
the Finance Ministry officials nor Brofoss himself consistently 
differentiated between dollars and other foreign currency.
There is certainly no doubt that the estimates of foreign ex­
change reserves presented by the Ministry of Finance to the
50Foreign Ministry in early July gave figures in the aggregate 
In any, attempt at explaining the August crisis bureaucratic 
inadequacy and the desire to see the rosier side of the situa­
tion must be combined with the probable impact of the strongly 
held belief in the depression.
In spite of the weakened dollar position Norway did not 
opt for enthusiastic cooperation at the second half of the 
Paris conference, nor during the subsequent Washington talks. 
There could hardly be any doubt that bridgebuilding was a lost 
cause, both because of the drift of the Marshall Plan negotia­
tions and because of generally increasing international ten­
sion. After the establishment of the Cominform the Norwegian 
Communists came out strongly against the Marshall Plan. They 
had previously kept a fairly low profile. Kontakt moved in the 
other direction, publishing articles critical of Russia and 
more positive towards the United States, even to the extent of
accepting that the Marshall Plan aimed at solving a European
51dollar problem
Yet the government remained hesitant, publicly declaring 
that it would consider Norway's foreign policy and security 




























































































towards the end of the year. Even after the failure of the
London conference reorientation was postponed, despite the
fact that the foreign policy makers felt that the bridge-buil-52ding policy was losing entirely in credibility . The first
public moves towards a reorientation came only after Ernest
Bevin's January 22 1948 speech which launched the Western
Union and later NATO. With the crisis in Czechoslovakia, the
Russian pact proposal to Finland, and the rumours of a similar
proposal to Norway, the process accelerated and led to Norwe-
53gian NATO membership
During this period of waiting and hesitation, the Marshall 
Plan negotiators were left without clear instructions. The 
previous strong advocacy of aid with no foreign policy im­
plications was abandoned. But it was not replaced by a more 
positive attitude towards European cooperation, nor by any 
attempt on the part of Oslo to revise upwards the inadequate 
dollar estimates of July. Drift and uncertainty provided room 
for the delegation leaders to manoeuvre. Klaus Sunnana was 
representative of the anti-American attitudes on the left of 
the Labour Party. He was also opposed to moves towards Wes­
tern European integration, and was included in the delegation
partly in order to modify Ole Colb jjzhrnsen' s American and general
54 oWestern sympathies . Sunnana was at times more obstructionist
than the government in Oslo, on one instance in September go-55ing beyond his instructions in resisting American pressure
But drift and indecision also gave the proponents of 
greater cooperation and closer integration with the West their 
chance. Towards the end of August Ole Colbjjz$rnsen on his own 
initiative raised the Norwegian dollar requirements from $100 
to $170, a move which was later authorized by the Minister of 
Finance. During the latter half of the Paris conference Col- 
bj0rnsen also maintained that in general American demands
were fairly reasonable, and should pose no great problems for
M 56Norway
Hesitation thus gave rocm for local initiatives, and for 
rival conceptions of Norwegian policy to influence Oslo. Fi­




























































































considerations. During the fall he repeatedly emphasized that 
the import reductions that followed in the wake of the August 
crisis, at first all the import licences which had earlier 
been issued were withdrawn, were detrimental to rational eco­
nomic planning and might severely hamper reconstruction and 
growth. Still the cabinet made no further moves to revise its 
estimates of dollar requirements upwards. This points exclu­
sively to the primacy of foreign policy considerations, though
we might find some justified fear of undue foreign intervention
5 7in Norwegian economic policy . Only in February were the
first steps taken to change the basis of Norwegian Marshall 
5 8Plan policies . By then leading members of the cabinet had 
decided that rising tension between East and West made bridge- 
-building untenable and the wheels were set in motion for a
move to the West. The Finnish and Czech crises accelerated the
59process
Only then were Ole Colbjjzhrnsen, Gunnar Jahn and others 
let loose on the Americans to gain acceptance for higher dollar 
requirements. They were helped in their efforts by the fact 
that both the State Department and prominent senators immedia­
tely noticed the stronger Western orientation of the govern­
ment, and in particular the very outspoken attacks on the
6 0Communists as possible fifth columnists . But even with grow­
ing sympathy in the United States and a vigorous effort by 
the US ambassador in Oslo, ColbjjzSrnsen had to struggle hard to 
achieve minor improvements in American and CEEC estimates of 
Norwegian needs. He was hampered by the fact that the press as 
well as politicians and government spokesmen for a long time
had emphasized Norway's ability to go it alone, or to manage
61with only limited American aid . The foreign policy motivated 
optimism of 1947 turned out to be quite a heavy burden in 
1948.
Norwegian negotiators were also hampered by the fact that 
the change in foreign policy came rather late to influence the 




























































































already been made. A major upward revision of Norwegian re­
quirements might well turn out to be part of a zero sum game. 
More dollars for Norway might easily result in less for other
participating countries. The Belgians in particular seem to
6 2have resisted changes favouring Norway
Colbj^rnsen did meet with some success both in securing 
a greater total amount of aid, and in achieving a greater pro­
portion of grants as opposed to loans. This must partly be 
attributed to his relentless efforts and his knowledge of the 
Washington scene. But it seems above all that Norway received
more favoured treatment because of its recent pro-Western
6 3stance and the possibility of its Russian threat to it 





























































































In the summer of 1948 the OEEC countries agreed to put 
together long term plans for the duration of the Marshall Aid 
programme. Having already decided to approach the West for 
some sort of security guarantee and, as a corollary, to ex­
ploit fully the possibilities of the Marshall Plan, the Nor­
wegian government eagerly grasped the opportunity being offered. 
The Labour Party was in fact given the chance of implementing 
its own economic programme with American backing and an assured 
dollar supply. The Norwegian plan was presented to the Stor­
ting in the fall of 1948 and generated very considerable oppo­
sition among the parties to the right. The plan represented 
basically a reiteration of the industrialization and moderni­
zation plans which had previously caused such loud disagree­
ments. While the bourgeois opposition supported Labour foreign 
policy realignment, the disagreements over economic policy 
seem to have remained strong. Within the Conservative party 
the advocates of agriculture seemed to be strengthening their 
position from 1948-49 and into the early 1950s, while strongly
emphasizing Norway's vulnerability to international depression
64and armed conflict
Loud and possibly bitter confrontation over the programme 
might have been expected. As it turned out only the Communists 
and two members of the Agrarian party came out in open oppo­
sition. Basically the political context for agreement or dis­
agreement had changed significantly since 1947. The importance 
of dollars must have been obvious to the entire Labour Party.
As with the Common Programme the long term programme essentially 
reflected Labour's modernization policies, and the virulent 
Communist opposition helped the Labour Party close ranks ^  .
For the bourgeois opposition the foreign policy dimension 
was decisive. Opposition to the long term programme ran high 
in all the three main parties. It was generally agreed that it 
represented another attempt at promoting structural change to 
the detriment of Norwegian agriculture. There were within all 
three parties those who advocated fighting the government White 




























































































parliamentary finance committee. When the committee reported 
to the Storting, the elements of commitment to planning were 
somewhat modified and the long term programme as such was not 
put to a parliamentary vote. The Labour Party could thus em­
phasize the elements of plan and structural change that were 
retained and which undoubtedly were carried further than could 
be squared with the economic policy aims of the majority of 
mainstream bourgeois politicians. They could on the other hand
point to the actual modifications and to the fact that formally
6 6they were not committed to act upon the programme
The Labour chairman of the committee, Mons Lid, and Sjur 
Lindebrekke as committee rapporteur were responsible for the 
compromise. Lindebrekke seems to have been the main engineer 
of the near-unanimous committee report. Emil LjzSvlien of the 
Communist party was the sole dissenter. From the Labour point 
of view he must have been eminently suitable for the task. In 
financial debates he was consistently closer to the Labour Party 
than other opposition politicians and if he could carry his own 
party along, the Liberals and Agrarians would probably also 
join in the compromise. Foreign policy and the necessity for 
unanimity at home and in OEEC discussions lay at the bottom 
of the compromise. In the current situation the Conservatives 
wished to avoid what Lindebrekke feared would be the: "greatest 
debate on economic issues since the war". Lindebrekke convinced 
his colleagues in the Conservative parliamentary caucus, and 
in the Storting argued for putting aside narrow party conside­
rations. Mons Lid was very blunt in his parliamentary state­
ment: "In this matter there is an unbridgeable gap between Mr.
6 7Ljrivlien's party and all other parties" . The Communists, in 
short, were no longer to be considered a responsible national 
political party and their own statements provided perfect ar­
guments for such an exclusion.
But there was much reluctance on the right. The compromise 
makers desired to limit parliamentary discussion to Lindebrekke's 
report and L^vlien's minority report. Thus the Communists would 




























































































unanimity was beyond the reach of compromise. The Agrarians 
would not leave the Communists to voice the sole misgivings 
about the long term programme. They did not want to be seen 
supporting the structural changes proposed, even if they did
not ccmmit themselves formally to implement the plan. Once the Agrarians had
demonstrated their reluctance the Liberals followed suit to such an extent68that Labour spokesmen wondered why they had not dissented in the ccrrmittee
The Conservatives under Lindebrekke's coaching honoured 
their commitment to the compromise. But in the parliamentary 
caucus the sceptics had made sure that they were not committed 
to carry out Labour policies and that the compromise formulas 
in some respects marked a distance from what were considered 
Brofoss's policies. They made their cooperation conditional
upon Brofoss behaving as agreed and decided to come out against
69the long term programme in the Conservative press
But even within the framework of this very loose compro­
mise the Agrarians and the Liberals were afraid of letting 
"that conservative" be their spokesman. His sympathies for 
Labour modernization and equity goals and his opposition to 
farm support made it necessary for them to advocate their 
own points of view. They came perilously close to undermining 
the whole compromise formula. In the end two Agrarians joined 
the Communists in opposing the long term programme. One of 
them, a prominent Agrarian leader through most of the post­
war period, Jon Leirfall, declared that he could not vote in 
favour of structural change that would hurt agriculture. He 
emphasized that he understood the importance of the foreign
policy issues at stake, but he was not willing to disregard70the vital issues of domestic economic policy
The compromise reached was both fragile and of limited 
duration. It did not preclude public debate and while the Con­
servatives were strong proponents of the deal during the next
few years they came out even more strongly in favour of agri- 
71culture . But it did provide for a measure of unity under 
extremely difficult international and domestic circumstances. 
The compromise makers succeeded in isolating the threat from 
the left through emphasizing the primacy of foreign policy.




























































































ticular saw the advantages of compromise. It was desirable 
to compromise on economic policy, and keep Labour Party dis­
sension to a minimum on foreign policy matters.
The compromise over the long term programme in the OEEC
foreshadows compromises of the 1950s and in particular the
7 2importance of foreign policy unanimity . The necessity for 
isolating the Communists was to a certain extent replaced by 
the desire to contain possible Labour Party rebels. Within 
the Conservative Party it foreshadows the ultimate decline 
of the agricultural wing of the party, as well as the com­
plete disappearance of the party's old style nationalists 
and small state ideologues. The Gaullists within the Conser­
vative Party have all gone.
The incipient alliance between the radical left with 
representatives of rural and peripheral areas within most 
parties was nipped in the bud. Neither could old style na­
tionalists compete in the new foreign policy climate. We 
can only speculate on matters where we lack the research to 
draw even tentative conclusions. But the abortive debate 
on the OEEC long term programme contains many of the elements 
of the struggle over Common Market membership during the 
1960s and 1970s. In the campaign against the Common Market, 
however, the disparate elements of opposition managed to 
join hands against the Conservatives and the Labour Party 
leadership. We may speculate that in this case the Cold War 
issue was at most a subsidiary one. The opponents were brought 
together in the fight against change in the primary sector 
and by the fear of foreign dominance. In 1948 those issues 
were overshadowed by the necessity for growth and the desire 
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